Agency: Factor\u27s Liability for Conversion Committed on Behalf of Principal by Shapiro, Bernard J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 1 May 1947 Article 7
Agency: Factor's Liability for Conversion
Committed on Behalf of Principal
Bernard J. Shapiro
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Bernard J. Shapiro, Agency: Factor's Liability for Conversion Committed on Behalf of Principal, 31 Marq. L. Rev. 103 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol31/iss1/7
RECENT DECISIONS
Agency - Factor's Liability for Conversion Committed on Behalf of
Principal - Birmingham, a livestock dealer at the stockyards
in Sioux City, Iowa, owned fifteen cattle. A stranger, through mis-
representation of his identity, obtained said cattle from appellant by
making and issuing a false and worthless check for the purchase price
thereof. The stranger told appellant he proposed to feed the cattle
on his farm, but instead he had the cattle transported and delivered
to the appellee, a commission broker or factor selling and handling
livestock for others at the stockyards in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
Appellant did not learn of this delivery to appellee for immediate resale
until some time later. Appellee sold said cattle for the stranger to
a third party and collected and paid to the stranger, his principal,
the proceeds of said sale, less expenses and its commission. Appellant
sued the factor for damages for the wrongful conversion of said
cattle. Held: A factor or commission merchant who receives property
from his principal, sells it under latter's instructions, and pays him
the proceeds of the sale is guilty of a conversion if his principal had
no title thereto or right to sell the property. Birmingham v. Rice Bros.
(Iowa, 1947), 26 N.W, 2d. 39.
The majority rule, stated also in the Restatement of Agency,
is that an agent who does acts which would otherwise constitute con-
version of a chattel, is not relieved from liability by the fact that he
acts on account of his principal, and reasonably although mistakenly
believes that the principal is entitled to possession of the chattels?
A factor is not protected by any rule of good faith and innocence
of wrongdoing, which may protect a mere agent from liability in
conversion.3 In the instant case the title to the cattle did not pass
because of the fraud practiced by the principal. He not only mis-
represented himself, but he also gave a worthless check in payment
of the purchase price.4 Unquestionably the seller could have recovered
from the factor's principal. Therefore, since the principal is liable
for conversion, the factor who aided in perpetrating the wrong is
also liable.' The liability is based upon tort and not upon contract.
An important issue in the instant case was whether or not the
Packers' and Stockyards Act relieves market agencies from tort
liability for wrongful conversion and thus abrogates legal rights under
state law. The act makes it the duty of every stockyard owner and
" Mechem on Agency, 2d Ed., Section 2583 (1914).
2 Section 349, Restatement of Agency (1933).
3 Hoven v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 163 Minn. 339, 204 N.W. 29 (1925).
4 52Am. Jur. 823; Mulroney v. Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 171 N.W. 36
(1919).
5 Supra, Fh 3, 204 N.W. at 30.
6 Packers' and Stockyards Act of 1921, par. 1 et seq., 304, 307, 312, 7 U.S.C.A.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
market agency to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimina-
tion, reasonable stockyard services at such stockyard. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that various stockyards of the country, coming
within the Act, and the marketing agencies connected therewith, are
public utilities and must comply with rules prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture." Therefore, a logical conclusion would be that
since the buyer and seller of livestock on commission, the factor in
the instant case, is not at liberty to select its customers, or principals
for whom it sells, it is unreasonable to hold it liable in conversion
where it is required by law to make a sale of livestock? The ma-
jority of the court in the instant case, in a five to four decision, held
contrary to the Minnesota decision.' The court felt that such an
agency is not required to handle livestock where its principal is a
thief or holds a title otherwise defective, and may make reasonable
requirements that one proposing to deal with it establish his identity
and the ownership of and title to the livestock involved.
The conclusion reached by the Minority judges in this Iowa case
seem to be more reasonable and just. They recognized that the Act
does change the status of these agencies, livestock brokers, from that
of ordinary factors to that of public utilities.1 1 These agencies were
bound as a public utility to render the service upon a reasonable re-
quest- 2 Therefore, factors operating under the Packers' and Stock-
yard Act should not be held to the same liability as ordinary factors
or agents for wrongful conversion. Instead, they should be treated
as an exception to the general rule and held not liable as in the
Missouri case13 decided in 1942.
BERNARD J. SHAPIRO
7 Id., par. 213.
8 Tagg Brothers & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420., 50 S. Ct. 220., 74
L.Ed. 524 (1930); Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288
(1936) ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S.Ct. 397, 402, 66 L.Ed. 735, 23
A.L.R. 229 (1922).
9 Mason City Production Credit Association v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn.
537, 268 N.W. 713, 715 (1939).
10 Id.
11Supra, Fh.8, 280 U.S. at 429; Farmers' Livestock Commission Co. v. U.S.,
D.C., 54 F. (2d) 375 (1931).
12 Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S. W. (2d) 91 (1942).
Id. 236 Mo. App. 1217.
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